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KESAN WARAN BERSTRUKTUR TERHADAP PRESTASI FIRMA DI 
MALAYSIA: PERANAN PEMILIKAN INSTITUSI 
 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
Penyelidikan ini bertujuan untuk meneroka sama ada kewujudan waran 
berstruktur menghasil apa-apa nilai kepada firma dalam jangka pendek and jangka 
panjang berdasarkan pasaran waran berstruktur di Malaysia . Tempoh masa kajian ini 
meliputi tahun 2006 hingga tahun 2014. Untuk mengkaji kesan jangka pendek waran 
berstruktur, kajian ini menganalisa sama ada penyenaraian waran berstruktur akan 
mengahasilkan apa-apa impak ke atas saham pendasar melalui metodologi kajian 
peristiwa dan pemboleh ubah dummy. Hasil kajian ini mendedahkan bahawa 
pulangan saham pendasar telah meningkat sekitar hari penyenaraian waran 
berstruktur, tetapi tiada pulangan luar biasa yang dapat dikesan. Di samping itu, 
jumlah dagangan saham pendasar juga telah meningkat dengan ketara selepas 
penyenaraian waran berstruktur. Sementara itu, turun-naik harga kepada saham 
pendasar telah dikurangkan dengan ketara selepas hari penyenaraian waran 
berstruktur. Hasil analisa juga menunjukkan bahawa jurang bida-tawar telah menjadi 
lebih kecil selepas penyenaraian waran berstruktur walaupun kesannya tidak ketara.  
Secara keseluruhannya, kualiti pasaran saham asas telah bertambah baik dalam 
jangka pendek selepas pengenalan waran berstruktur. Untuk mengkaji kesan jangka 
panjang waran berstruktur, kajian ini menganalisa sama ada kewujudan waran 
berstruktur dapat dikaitkan dengan peningkatan prestasi firma dengan menggunakan 
stok pulangan sebagai petunjuk prestasi. Buat pertama kalinya, pemilikan institusi 
dianggap sebagai satu faktor yang dapat mengeratkan hubungan antara prestasi firma 
dan waran berstruktur. Selain itu, dalam kajian ini, pemilikan institusi dibahagikan 
xi 
 
kepada pemilikan asing dan pemilikan domestik supaya dapat menentukan sama ada 
identiti pemilik institusi adalah penting untuk mengeratkan hubungan antara prestasi 
firma dan waran berstruktur. Dengan menggunakan model pemilihan Heckman, 
keputusan yang diperolehi menunjukkan bahawa kewujudan waran berstruktur dapat 
dikaitkan dengan prestasi firma secara positif dan ketara. Di samping itu, hasil kajian 
juga menunjukkan bahawa kewujudan pemilikan institusi domestik mempunyai 
impak yang positif terhadap hubungan antara prestasi firma dan waran berstruktur.  
Walau bagaimanapun, tiada kesan yang dapat ditemui pada pemilikan institusi asing. 
Ini menunjukkan bahawa kewujudan waran berstruktur boleh meningkatkan nilai 
terhadap firma dalam jangka masa panjang dan identiti pelabur institusi adalah faktor 
penting yang dapat mempengaruhi  hubungan di antara prestasi syarikat dan waran 
berstruktur. Kesimpulannya, keputusan kajian ini menunjukkan bahawa kewujudan 
waran berstruktur adalah dikaitkan dengan penghasilan nilai firma dalam jangka 
pendek dan jangka panjang di Malaysia. 
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THE EFFECTS OF STRUCTURED WARRANTS ON FIRM 
PERFORMANCE IN MALAYSIA: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL 
OWNERSHIP 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This research is motivated to explore whether the existence of structured 
warrants creates any value to its underlying firms in both short-run and long-run 
based on the Malaysian structured warrants market. The time frame of this study 
covers year 2006 until 2014. In order to gauge the short-run impact, the analysis 
concerning the impact of structured warrants listing on the behaviour of its 
underlying stocks is performed based on the event study and dummy variable 
methodology. The findings reveal that the return of the underlying stocks has 
increased significantly surrounding the event of structured warrants listing, however, 
no abnormal return is being detected. Meanwhile the results also show the trading 
volume of the underlying stocks has experienced an upsurge while the spot price 
volatility is found to have significantly lower in the post-event period.  Also, the gap 
of bid-ask spread has become relatively smaller subsequent to structured warrants 
initiation even though the impact is less significant. Overall, the market quality of the 
underlying stocks has improved in short-run due to the availability of structured 
warrants. In order to gauge the impact in long-run, this research examines whether 
the existence of structured warrants is associated with firm performance by using 
stock return as the performance indicator. For the first time, the institutional 
ownership is being considered as the factor which is able to enhance the relationship 
between structured warrants and firm performance. Also, in this research, 
institutional ownership is further segregated into foreign and domestic category with 
xiii 
 
the objective to determine whether the identity of institutional owners matters in 
improving connection between structured warrants and firm performance. By 
employing Heckman selection model, the results obtained indicate that the 
availability of structured warrants is positively and significantly associated with firm 
performance. Further, the findings also reveal that the existence of domestic 
institutional ownership has significant positive impact on the connection between 
structured warrants and firm performance, while no impact is being found on foreign 
institutional ownership. Taken together,  the evidence produced through long-run 
analysis imply that the presence of structured warrants is able to generate firm 
performance in long-run and the identity of institutional investors matters in 
influencing the nexus between structured warrants and firm performance. Based on 
the evidence tabled, this research therefore concludes that the presence of structured 
warrants is associated with firm performance generation in both short-run and long-
run in Malaysia. 
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  CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 Background of Study 
As the economy progress over time, the need to have an efficient capital 
market has becoming more urgent than ever if scarce capital resources are to be 
utilized efficiently. In recent decades, the results from a number of academic 
research show that financial derivatives are effective in increasing the efficiency of 
the capital market. 
 
A financial derivative, as indicated by its name, ‘derives’ its value from its 
underlying asset. The existence of financial derivatives has provided market 
participants an alternative to lock-in asset prices and at the same time alleviating the 
investment risk. It is indeed one of the most amazing innovations in the arena of 
financial engineering in this twentieth century.   
 
The exchange-traded financial derivatives are originated from the United 
States. The Chicago Board of Trade, which established in 1848, was the first 
formalized futures exchange in the United States. Listed stock options began its 
trading in April 1973 on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). Compared 
to financial assets such as stocks and bonds which have been exchange-traded for 
more than a century, financial derivatives are still new. For example, interest rate 
futures, which is the world’s oldest exchange traded financial derivative, began 
trading on the floor of the Chicago Board of Trade in 1975, is hardly 50 years old. 
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Most of the more exotic forms of derivatives are instruments that did not even exist a 
decade ago. Today, there is a broad spectrum of derivative instruments, many with 
very exotic names and highly specialized purposes.   The commonly available 
derivative instruments include futures contracts, forward contracts , equity options, 
swaps and warrants. 
 
 Market players can use derivatives to hedge, to arbitrage, or to speculate. 
Hedging risk with derivatives is akin of buying an insurance against the undesired 
future outcome. Hedging is the process of shifting the risk from hedgers, who are 
reluctant to bear the risk, to parties who are more willing to bear them. Through this, 
derivatives assist in risk allocation between different individuals and groups in the 
economy.  
 
 Arbitraging is a way of making profits from price differentials between 
markets. Arbitrageurs will monitor the quoted prices of the same assets/instruments 
in different markets and started to cash in the profits should they detect the 
opportunity to buy from the market with lower price and sell in the market where the 
quoted price is higher. By doing so, the low price will be driven up and the high price 
will be driven down. The process will continue until an equilibrium is achieved. This 
could help market prices back into alignment and thus assist in keeping prices 
consistent across markets.  
 
 Investors can also use derivatives to speculate. Speculators are traders who 
accept risk in which hedgers do not want. Speculators accept the risk because they 
believe the potential return outweigh the risk .They are betting on the price of the 
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underlying asset will move in tandem with their expectations over the life of the 
contract. The existence of speculators is crucial in providing the liquidity in the 
financial market. This liquidity enables other investors, who may be using 
derivatives to hedge risk, to buy and sell derivative contracts more easily.  
 
Derivative is a contract entered by two parties. Some relates derivative as the 
zero-sum monetary games since the amount paid by one party of the contract is the 
amount received by the other party. When the contract expires or is exercised, the 
gains and losses completely offset each other. Even though derivatives represent 
zero-sum monetary games, they need not represent zero-sum economic games.  
 
Researchers such as Ross (1976) and Detemple & Selden (1991) claim that 
the presence of options completes the market by expanding the investment 
opportunities of investors by helping them to achieve their desired payoffs. The 
increased investment states provided by options will further stimulate the demand of 
the underlying stocks, reduce its rate of return and lead to increased spot price. 
 
In addition to market completion, the existence of options is expected to 
improve the information environment of its underlying equity market. Researchers 
such as Black (1975), Watt, Yadav & Draper (1992), Kumar, Sarin & Shastri (1998) 
and Faff & Hiller (2005) claim that the benefits of options such as better leveraged 
gain, lower transaction cost and truncated downside risk may entice informed traders 
who are initially active in the spot market to migrate to the options market. The 
exodus of informed traders to the options market will lower the level of trading noise 
in the spot market, reduce the adverse selection risk faced by the uninformed 
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investors in the spot market, attract the existing and new market entrants to trade in 
the underlying stocks and subsequently improve its liquidity (Kumar, Sarin & 
Shastri ,1998; Faff & Hiller, 2005). Moreover, past studies also indicate that 
information releases by media and financial experts on optioned firms tend to renew 
the information set of investors concerning the intrinsic value of the firms. As such, 
the participation rate of the investors in the underlying asset market will grow due to 
lower trading risk and subsequently improve the liquidity of the underlying stocks 
(Skinner, 1990; Watt, Yadav & Draper, 1992).  
 
Findings from Manaster & Rendlemen (1982), Bhattacharya (1987) and 
Anthony (1988), Easley, O’Hara & Srinivas (1998), Chakravarty, Gulen & Mayhew 
(2004) and Pan & Poteshman (2006) show that options is a preferred trading ground 
for informed investors. The private information which initially possessed by the 
informed traders will first be reflected in options price or its trading volume and 
subsequently embodied into the spot price. In short, options trading enables 
information transmission, improves stock price efficiency and stabilizes spot price. 
 
Roll, Schwartz & Subramanyam (2009) posit that incremental information 
revealed in stock price through the informed trading in options market may enable an 
optioned firm to allocate its resources more efficiently and eventually improves firm 
performance. They find a significant positive relationship between the optioned firms’ 
trading volume and their Tobin’s Q. The linkage between informational efficiency 
and firm performance has been discussed by researchers such as Durnev, Morck & 
Yeung (2004); Giammarino, Heinkel, Hollifield & Li (2004); Markovitch, Skeckel & 
Yeung (2005) and Chen, Goldstein & Wang (2007). These authors point out that 
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informative stock price is able to guide managers in making better corporate 
investment decisions which will later convert to better firm performance. 
 
Some may wonder if it is sensible to expect managers extracting information 
from stock price since they should be more informed about their own firms than the 
outside market traders. The conventional wisdom that insiders possess superior 
information precludes any possibility of learning from stock price. Thus, the stock 
market simply becomes a ‘sideshow’. To act in the best interest of the long-term 
shareholders, managers can make investment decisions based on their own views on 
growth opportunities and ignore stock price fluctuations (Morck, Shleifer 
&Vishny,1990). 
 
However, recent strand of research suggest that stock market does not 
necessarily acting as a ‘sideshow’. Instead, stock market works as an information 
aggregator from outside investors, and thus the insiders or managers can improve 
their resource allocation abilities by learning from stock price (Chen, Goldstein & 
Jiang, 2007). According to Bond, Edmans & Goldstein (2012), learning from 
outsiders does not imply that managers are less informed, just that this move will 
enable managers to accumulate and arrange information in a more meaningful 
manner and eventually increase the effectiveness of their decisions. The authors 
further claim that managers may be the most informed party about their firms in the 
economy, but there are still aspects about which they can learn from outsiders.  
 
Subrahmanyam & Titman (1999) stress on the role of information serendipity 
– that is the extent in which stock market investors may, by chance, deduce value-
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relevant information through their daily activities. For instance, a store manager may 
obtain valuable information about the market acceptance of his firm’s products in the 
course of managing the firm’s daily operations. Moreover, a financial analyst who 
evaluates the performance of one firm may find out relevant information about 
another firm. At first glance, one might expect that the contribution of serendipitous 
information in terms of resource allocation should be minimal because there is 
always a higher chance for individuals to receive inaccurate information rather than 
serendipitous information. However, with a substantial pool of stock market 
participants, the cumulative impact of serendipitous information on price efficiency 
can be enormous even though the population that possesses such information is 
insignificant. Hence, optimal real decisions should be dependent on the interaction of 
internal information (information set possessed by manager), as well as the external 
information (e.g. the state of the economy, the position of competitors, the demand 
by consumers, etc). Stock price serves as an intermediary in guiding and facilitating 
the efficient allocation of resources, especially when outside investors have an 
information advantage over insiders. On the whole, stock price efficiency improves 
managers’ learning (Durnev, Morck & Yeung, 2004; Giammarino, Heinkel, 
Hollifield & Li, 2004; Markovitch, Skeckel & Yeung, 2005; Chen, Goldstein & 
Wang, 2007). In aggregate, evidence generated by past studies collectively indicates 
that the existence of options is associated with firm performance.  To date, the 
studies concerning the relationship between derivatives and its underlying firms are 
mainly derived from the more developed U.S. options market. Still, whether other 
derivative products also playing a similar role in the emerging market remains 
largely unknown due to the differences in social systems, economic microstructures, 
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stages of economic development and financial market structures between the 
emerging market and its developed counterpart.  
 
Options and warrants are identical derivative instruments. Similar to options, 
warrants give the holder the right to purchase and sell the underlying asset at an 
exercise price during a certain period. Options/warrants are appealing because they 
allow investors to participate in the future performance of the underlying asset at a 
fraction of its cost, in both bullish and bearish market. Some differences between 
options and warrants include: 1) warrants are mostly issued by third party issuer such 
as the  investment banks or stock brokers and traded on stock exchange, while 
options are usually issued and traded on derivative exchange; 2) the lifespan of 
warrants are usually last longer than options, generally ranging from 3 months to 15 
years while the life span of options normally ranging from 9 months to 1 year.   It 
would be interesting to find out whether warrants possess a function in influencing 
firm value as options based on the emerging market.  
 
To the author’s best knowledge, the association between structured warrants 
and firm performance remains an untapped area of research in Malaysia. As such, the 
mission of this study is to fill in the research gap by investigating the role of 
structured warrants in firm performance based on Malaysian environment. 
 
This research seeks to provide new knowledge by further postulating that the 
function of structured warrants in generating firm performance will be strengthened 
in the presence of institutional ownership. Malaysian firms are normally subject to 
type II agency problem or what is commonly known as the conflict of interest 
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between controlling shareholders and outside minority shareholders  (Claessens & 
Fan 2002) . The type II agency problem tends to increase the level of information 
opaqueness due to information hoarding by the controlling owner-managers (Fan & 
Wong, 2002). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the information searching cost 
of the skilled or sophisticated investors will become more expensive and 
simultaneously reduce their incentive to trade in structured warrants. Following this, 
the function of structured warrants in improving spot price efficiency will be 
weakened and subsequently affects its contribution in firm performance. The 
relationship between structured warrants and firm performance might not be 
prevalent if firm is haunted by type II agency problem. Also, type II agency problem 
may hamper the managers’ motivation to extract additional information from stock 
price. If the entrenched managers have the incentive to misappropriate firms’ 
resources for their own private benefit, they are very likely to ignore market signals 
or there is no information for them to refer to due to information opaqueness. Again, 
under this setting, the connection between structured warrants and firm performance 
might not be obvious. Taken together, it is reasonable to aspect that the role of 
structured warrants in influencing firm performance should also depend on a firm’s 
ability to manage its agency problem. 
 
Recently, a considerable number of studies show that institutional ownership 
is able to tackle the agency problem within firms. Factors such as substantial amount 
of investment, expensive exit cost, expertise in financial and management know-how 
have made the institutional investors an ideal candidate in performing corporate 
monitoring activities (Velury & Jenkins, 2006; Hashim & Devi, 2012; Bajo, Bigelli 
& Hiller, 2013; Ahmad & Jusoh, 2014). A better governed firm under the oversight 
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the institutional owners is able to attract market investors to perform information 
search and at the same time increase their incentive to use structured warrants to 
profit from their information set. Under this scenario, the incremental information 
possessed by them will be impounded into spot price and subsequently promote spot 
price efficiency when they start to transact in warrants market.  More efficient spot 
price will enable firms to allocate their resources more efficiently and eventually lead 
to better firm performance. Based on the rationale discussed, this research therefore 
postulates that the nexus between structured warrants and firm performance will be 
enhanced in the presence of institutional ownership.  
 
Past studies also show that not all institutional investors are equally effective 
in corporate monitoring. The proponents of foreign monitoring mechanism claim that 
the characteristics such as  lesser business ties with the corporate insiders, as well as  
the knowledge and experience in implementing good governance practices in good 
governance countries, have equipped the foreign institutional investors the capability 
to take an active stance against the errant corporate insiders  (Ferreira & Matos, 2008; 
Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira & Matos, 2011; Garner & Kim, 2013; Chen, El Ghoul, 
Guedhami & Wang, 2014). On the other hand, the proponents of domestic 
monitoring mechanism opine that the problem of geographic distance may weaken 
the monitoring incentive of foreign investors because they may need to bear 
additional monitoring cost in the midst of performing their monitoring duties (e.g: 
information acquisition cost, travelling cost, international administrative cost etc.) .  
 
The geography proximity is expected to provide the domestic institutional 
investors a better edge in performing arm’s length monitoring function. It is because 
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the local investors normally located in the same geographical region as their investee 
firms, hence are able to collect and process information concerning the internal 
matters of their investments at a relatively lower monitoring cost. They are also 
capable to approach the management to demand for policies changes in a timely 
manner should they feel uncomfortable over certain corporate issues. (Gasper & 
Massa, 2007; Kang & Kim, 2008; Chhaochharia, Kumar & Niessen-Ruenzi, 2012 ).  
 
Based on the insights tabled above, it is possible that the linkage between 
structured warrants and firm performance is also influenced by the identity of the 
institutional owners. In this research, the institutional ownership is further segregated 
into foreign and domestic category in order to determine the validity of this intuition. 
 
1.2 Overview of Malaysian Warrants Market 
 
Warrants are financial derivatives which ‘derive’ its value from other assets. 
The underlying asset may be any asset including a single stock, a basket of stocks, an 
index, a currency, a commodity or future contracts.  Warrants give the buyer the right, 
but not the obligations, to buy or sell an underlying asset at a pre-determined price 
(commonly referred to as the strike price or exercise price) on or before a specified 
date (commonly referred to as the expiry date or maturity date). The investor pays a 
price (a premium) for owning warrants. If at expiry, the price of the underlying asset 
is higher than the exercise price, the investor will exercise the warrants. The 
difference between the market price of the underlying asset and the exercise price is 
the gross profit on the warrants investment. Net profit is arrived after deducting the 
price paid for the warrants from the gross profit. However, if the price of the 
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underlying asset is below the exercise price, the warrants will expire worthless. The 
loss is limited to the price (premium) paid. 
 
 Currently, the types of warrants which are currently available in Bursa 
Malaysia include the structured warrants and the company-issued warrants. 
Structured warrants are further divided into three categories : the call warrants, the 
put warrants and the callable bull/bear certificates (CBBC). A call warrant gives a 
holder the right to buy the underlying share at a specified price within a limited 
period of time . Currently, the majority of the structured warrants being traded on 
Bursa Malaysia are the call warrants.  
 
A put warrant, on the other hand, gives a holder the right to sell the 
underlying share at a specified price within a limited period of time. Previously, all 
structured warrants listed on Bursa Malaysia are on the ‘buy side’. Effective from 3 
August 2009, the revised regulatory framework of the Main Market allows the 
issuance and listing of put warrant.   
 
A CBBC is financial instrument that track the performance of an underlying 
instrument without requiring investors to pay the full price of the underlying 
instrument. The CBBC is first issued by CIMB Bank on Bursa Malaysia in July 2010. 
The number of put warrants and CBBCs being traded on Bursa Malaysia during the 
period of study are limited. Hence, this research will therefore concentrate on the 
impact brought in by call warrants only.  
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 Structured warrants are issued by a third party.  At present, the structured 
warrants issuers in Malaysia comprise both the international and local financial 
institutions. The prominent issuers of structured warrants include CIMB Bank Bhd., 
AmBank Bhd., RHB Investment Bank Bhd., Kenanga Investment Bank Bhd., 
Maybank Investment Bank Bhd. and Macquarie Capital Securities (M) Sdn. Bhd. 
The first structured call warrants in Malaysia were issued by Commerce International 
Merchant Bankers on Maybank shares in June 1995.  
 
Based on the Bursa Malaysia’s Main Market Listing Requirements, the issuer 
must ensure that over the past three months before the issuance date of structured 
warrants, the underlying securities must achieve an average daily market 
capitalization of at least RM1 billion,  or RM3 billion for the newly listed 
corporations that do not meet the three months market capitalization track record. 
Furthermore, the aggregate outstanding structured warrants issued at any one time, 
inclusive of those that have already been issued, must not more than 20% of the 
share capital of the underlying securities.  
 
The issuer must ensure that, upon the initial listing, the structured warrants 
must be held by at least 100 warrant holders whereby each one of them must hold not 
less than 1 board lot of warrants. Alternatively, the structured warrants must be held 
by at least 50 warrant holders, whereby each one of them must hold not less than 1 
board lot of warrants, provided that each of these warrant holders subscribe for a 
minimum of RM100,000 of warrants. Currently, the trading of structured warrants 
must be in a board lot comprising 100 units. The minimum issue price of structured 
warrants must be at least RM0.15 per warrant. 
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After issuing the structured warrants, the issuer is expected to ‘create a 
market’ for the warrants by providing the bid price and ask price. Structured warrants 
issuer needs to specify the settlement mode in the terms and conditions of the 
structured warrants issue. The settlement of structured warrants can be either by cash 
or by physical delivery of the underlying shares. Cash settlement means that the 
investors do not need to come up with cash to exercise the warrants. In most cases, 
the issuers will pay the warrants holders the difference between the share price and 
exercise price adjusted by the exercise ratio. On the other hand, physical delivery 
means that the issuer will have to supply the shares to the warrant holder who 
exercises his call warrants. However, this does not result in new shares being issued 
when it is being exercised.  
 
In Malaysia, structured warrants are usually cash-settled and have a life span 
ranging from 6 months to 5 years.  The structured warrants issuer need to determine 
the settlement price. The settlement price of the structured warrants can be based on 
the average closing price of the underlying security for the 5 market days prior to the 
expiry date or the closing price of the underlying security on the market day 
immediately before the expiry date. 
 
The term ‘warrants’ is originated from the United States and is first issued by 
the American Lights and Energy Company in 1911 (Zhang, 2008).  Malaysia seems 
to be the only country that adopts the term ‘structured warrants’. In the U.K., they are 
commonly known as ‘covered warrants’ or ‘derivative warrants’ in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan. 
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 The company – issued warrants are issued by companies. Companies usually 
issue warrants in conjunction with a fund-raising activity. This type of warrants 
usually act as a sweetener in association with a bond or equity issue and normally 
have an exercise period of up to 10 years. The company-issued warrants will result in 
new share being issued when it is being exercised and thus has a dilution impact on a 
company’s earnings per share.  
 
Our market allows warrants either in American-type or European-type. The 
American-type warrants can be exercised at any time during the life of the warrants 
whereas European-type warrants can be exercised only upon expiry. As such, the 
American-type warrants are preferred (due to its flexibility in exercise period) over 
the European-type, all things equal. 
 
In Malaysia, structured warrants are traded on the same platform as their 
underlying shares. Investors can trade warrants via the same individual’s share 
trading account, and hence lower the transaction cost. The synchronous trading of 
warrants and their underlying shares has increased the possibility of information 
linkage between the two assets. 
 
Table 1.1 shows the annual turnover value on the world’s most active 
warrants markets from year 2006 to 2015. The information from Malaysian market 
has been included as comparison. These figures are extracted and compiled from the 
annual market statistics published by the World Federation of Exchanges. 
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 Although warrants market are relatively new as compared to options market, 
nonetheless, the warrants market has recently achieved an exponential growth, 
especially in the Asia-Pacific and Europe region. As indicated in table 1.1, in Asia, as 
at 2015, warrants are most actively traded in Hong Kong (with annual turnover of 
USD 818,015.9 million in 2015) , Taiwan (with annual turnover of USD 20,376.7 
million in 2015), and Korea ( with annual turnover of USD18,478.1 million in  
2015) . While in Europe, warrants are most actively traded in Germany (with annual 
turnover of USD 50,127.2 million in 2015) and Switzerland (with annual turnover of 
USD 28,006.5 million in 2015).  In contrast, the structured warrants market in 
Malaysia is relatively smaller (with trading value of USD 3,590.9 million in 2015).  
 
In Malaysia, the trading value of structured warrants had once reached its 
peak in year 2007 (with the trading value of USD 3,838.7 million). However, the 
value transacted had plummeted to USD 315.8 million, represents an alarming 92% 
drop in year 2009.  The global stocks plunge caused by U.S subprime crisis which 
has been taken place in year 2008 could be the main contributor of this phenomenon.  
The Hong Kong and Korean market, on the other hand is quite sustainable. It is not 
seeing a drastic decline in its trading value as compared to Malaysia. After hitting its 
low in year 2009, the trading value of warrants market started to pick up steadily. 
The value transacted amounted to USD1,673.50 million in year 2011, an 
improvement of approximately 400% since year 2009. However, in year 2013, the 
trading value again experienced a drastic drop to USD361.60 million. The drastic 
drop in trading value could be due to the poor market sentiment in Malaysia, 
triggered by factors such as the increase in fuel price, higher transportation cost, 
subsidy rationalisation and electricity tariff hike in year 2013. Nevertheless, the 
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trading value started to rebound in year 2014. The trading value of structured 
warrants shows an improvement of 123% or USD704.30 million in year 2014. In 
year 2015, the trading value of structured warrants has achieved a buoyant growth of 
approximately 400% or USD 3,590.90 million as compared to year 2014.  
 
  
17 
 
Table 1.1: Annual turnover value of structured warrants based on selected markets (in USD Million) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
Hong Kong 
Exchanges 
and Clearing 
 
230, 359.4 
 
 
611, 507.3 
 
 
574 ,495.0 
 
 
429, 726.9 
 
 
533, 929.6 
 
 
576,035.6 
 
 
409,963.5 
 
 
393,534.4 
 
 
422,188.2 
 
 
818,015.9 
 
Korea 
Exchange 
 
43, 993.2 
 
73,043.5 
 
85, 691.5 
 
174 ,105.4 
 
354, 346.8 
 
288,621.0 
 
53, 462.7 
 
26,341.7 
 
18,723.9 
 
18,478.1 
 
Taiwan Stock 
Exchange 
Corp. 
 
5, 387.0 
 
7, 743.8 
 
8,857.2 
 
3, 241.9 
 
6, 606.8 
 
9, 719.2 
 
4,727.8 
 
11, 436.0 
 
22,340.0 
 
20,376.7 
 
Deutsche 
Boerse 
 
285,895.7 
 
439,678.8 
 
165,306.1 
 
87,885.3 
 
79,651.1 
 
96,562.1 
 
65, 377.9 
 
71,445.6 
 
51,180.5 
 
50,127.2 
 
Euronext 
 
39,814.6 
 
50,799.0 
 
47,773.9 
 
32,136.8 
 
34,772.6 
 
42,563.7 
 
24 013.2 
 
21,766.4 
 
21,518.3 
 
17,969.9 
 
SIX Swiss 
Exchange 
 
38 696.4 
 
63, 165.7 
 
55, 900.0 
 
34,564.4 
 
38,065.8 
 
59,262.2 
 
34, 210.3 
 
32,702.3 
 
28,877.2 
 
28,006.5 
 
Bursa 
Malaysia 
 
955.7 
 
3, 838.7 
 
380.9 
 
315.8 
 
1,051.2 
 
1,673.5 
 
1,422.0 
 
361.6 
 
704.3 
 
3,590.9 
 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges 
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Source: World Federation of Exchanges 
 
Figure 1.1: Annual turnover value of structured warrants based on Malaysian market 
(in USD Million) 
 
 
 Figure 1.1 is the graphical presentation of the annual turnover value of 
structured warrants based on Malaysian market from year 2006 to 2015. As can be 
seen from figure 1.1, the annual turnover value of Malaysian structured warrants has 
once reaching its peak in 2007 (USD 3,838.7 million in 2007), however hitting its 
low in 2009 (USD 315.8 million in 2009). Again, it experienced another plunge in 
2013 (USD361.60 million in 2013) but managed to rebound in 2014 (USD704.30 
million in 2014) and the positive trend continue until 2015 (USD 3,590.90 million in 
2015). 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
 
The traditional options pricing model, introduced by Black & Scholes (1973), 
show that in a complete market, the payoff of an option can be replicated through the 
combination of stock and riskless bond, and hence option has been regarded as a 
redundant security in this scenario . If options are redundant, the introduction of 
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options should produce no impact on its underlying stocks. However, both the 
theoretical and empirical research show that this is not the case. 
 
The research on the impact of derivatives on its underlying asset market has 
attracted much attention ever since Ross (1976) proposes that equity options playing 
a role in completing the market by expanding the opportunity set of investors, 
allowing investors to achieve optimal payoff state than would be possible prior to 
options listing. The theoretical works based on Ross (1976) and Detemple & Selden 
(1991) claim that the wider range of investment states encourage new investors to 
enter the market with a commensurate increase in the demand of underlying stocks, 
as well as its price, and at the same time lower the spot price volatility. 
 
Another strand of research claim that options trading may reduce the trading 
risk of its underlying asset by improving the information environment of its spot 
market and thus making the said asset more valuable. Benefits such as higher 
leverage gain, lower transaction cost and limited downside risk offered by options 
tend to attract informed traders who possess private information to trade in options 
market (Black,1975; Skinner,1990; Watt, Yadav & Draper, 1992; Kumar, Sarin & 
Shastri, 1998; Faff & Hiller, 2005). The migration of informed traders to options 
market reduces the level of asymmetric information in the spot market, lowers the 
chance of losses against the informed traders, and hence encourages the uninformed 
traders and the new market entrants to trade in the underlying stocks (Kumar, Sarin 
& Shastri, 1998; Faff & Hiller, 2005). As a result, options listing is expected to 
improve the quality of its underlying asset by improving its liquidity and at the same 
time reducing its spot price volatility (Kumar, Sarin & Shastri, 1998).  Further, 
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findings also show that greater level of public information produced by media and 
financial experts on the optioned firms is able to provide awareness to market 
investors concerning the fundamental value of the underlying stocks, improve their 
willingness to trade in the spot market and subsequently lead to better liquidity  
(Skinner,1990; Watt, Yadav & Draper, 1992). 
 
 Some researchers opine that firm-specific private information which initially 
possessed by informed investors will first be revealed in options price or trading 
volume and subsequently impounded into spot price (Skinner,1990; Manaster & 
Rendlemen,1982; Easley, O’Hara & Srinivas, 1998; Chakravarty, Gulen & Mathew, 
2004; Pan & Potestman, 2006). The flow of information from derivative to spot 
market will reduce the trading noise and stabilize the spot price as well as improve 
the liquidity of the underlying stocks (Grossman, 1988). 
 
Even though research shows that the existence of options may lead to market 
completion, improve the information environment of its underlying asset market and 
hence making its underlying asset more valuable, however, the recent derivatives- 
induced losses suffered by Procter & Gamble in 1994 (US$137 million), Barings 
PLC in 1995 (US$1.3 million), Orange County California in 1994 (US$1.7 million) 
and China Aviation Oil in 2004 (US$50 million) have cast doubts on the relevancy 
of derivatives in real world.  The world renowned investment guru, Warren Buffett 
(2003) was once making an attack on derivatives through his write-up in the 2002 
annual report of Berkshire Hathaway that “derivatives are financial weapons of mass 
destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.” As such, 
this has instilled fear among some market participants that there is something 
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inherently risky about derivatives and that the prudent one would try to avoid. The 
rationale behind this argument is that since options is a low-cost leveraged product, 
additional trading noise generated by speculators in the options market tends 
destabilize the spot price (Ma & Rao,1986; Stein, 1987; Skinner,1989; Bollen,1998). 
Some market observers also opine that the existence of options may divert the 
trading volume from the spot to the options market and subsequently create price 
pressure towards its spot price (Bollen,1988; Skinner,1989). 
 
Given these development, it would be interesting to find out whether the 
existence of derivative will bring in value or harm towards its underlying asset .To 
date, majority of the past studies related to derivative are normally based on options. 
According to past studies, if options lead to market completion or information 
improvement, the event of options listing should leave a favourable impact on its 
underlying securities. It is predicted that the abnormal return will be detected around 
the listing day, at the same time, the liquidity of the underlying securities tends to 
improve while the stock price volatility tends to reduce. On the other hand, if the 
existence of options invites speculative trading, effects such as negative and volatile 
spot price will be observed. 
 
Other than market completion and information improvement in the spot 
market, researchers also find that the listing of options improves stock price 
efficiency. Findings show that the information about the future stock price movement 
will first be revealed in options price or trading volume and subsequently 
incorporated into stock price (Manaster & Rendleman , 1982; Bhattacharya ,1987; 
Anthony , 1988; Turkington & Walsh, 2000 ; Easley, O’Hara & Srinivas, 1998; 
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Chakravarty, Gulen & Mayhew, 2004; Pan & Poteshman, 2006). Recently, Roll, 
Schwartz & Subrahmanyam (2009) claim that more efficient stock price derives from 
options trading will enable firm to allocate its resources more efficiently and 
eventually improves firm performance. This field of study builds its foundation 
based on the information role of options. The active information transmission 
between options and stock induced by informed trading increases the spot price 
efficiency.  When stock price is more aligned with its fundamental value, it can serve 
as a guide for managers in making appropriate investment decisions which will 
eventually convert into higher firm performance in the long-run (Chen, Goldstein, & 
Jiang, 2007; Durnev, Morck, & Yeung, 2004; Giammarino, Heinkel, Hollifield & Li, 
2004). 
 
In most non-U.S. countries around the world, the major form of agency 
problem normally derived from the conflict of interest between the controlling and 
minority shareholders or simply type II agency problem ( Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; 
Claessens & Fan 2002; Claessens, Djakov, Fan & Lang, 2002). The controlling 
shareholders normally hold more voting right than cash flow right through 
complicated ownership structure. Thus, they have the incentive and ability to divert 
corporate resources for their private gain at the expense of minority shareholders 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Claessens, Djakov, Fan & Lang, 2002; Florackis, Kostakis  
& Ozkan, 2009 ). In order to conceal their expropriating behaviour, the entrenched 
controlling owners have the tendency to involve in information hoarding activities 
(Fan & Wong, 2002) which will eventually increase the cost of information 
acquisition of the outside investors. Thus, it is expected that the outside investors 
may no longer interested to invest in this type of firm as well as its derivative 
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products due to higher trading risk. Under this situation, the observable effect of 
derivative trading on firm performance generation might not be obvious. Further, if 
the controlling owner-managers have the motivation to indulge in expropriating 
activities, the signals from stock market may serve no purpose to them, and once 
again, the linkage between derivative and firm performance may not be prevalent. In 
short, it is probable that the incremental benefit derived from derivative trading based 
on U.S. experience as suggested by Roll, Schwartz & Subrahmanyam (2009) may be 
less significant in non-U.S. market in the presence of type II agency problem. 
 
In order to alleviate the agency problem, Claessens & Fan (2002) propose 
corporate monitoring through institutional ownership as the solution. It is because 
institutional owners are normally formed by sophisticated investors who are experts 
in financial management and possess large pool of fund with the objective to make 
decent profits on behalf of their clients. They are normally independent from 
corporate insiders and hence more vocal to voice out their dissatisfaction over any 
corporate decision which is expected to affect their return on investment.   They have 
the ability to divest their investment and thereby increase a firm’s cost of capital 
should the management fail to fulfil their demand of profit. These factors have made 
the institutional shareholding an important element in corporate monitoring. 
Empirical findings from Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, & Matos (2011); Hadani, 
Goranova & Khan (2011); Hashim & Devi (2012); Lin, Wu, Fang & Wun (2014) 
and  Ahmad & Jusoh (2014) collectively show that firms under the oversight of 
institutional owners have better governance . 
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It is therefore sensible to expect that equities from a better governed firm 
under the oversight of institutional owner will attract the investing public to perform 
information search due to the risk of trading and information acquisition cost are 
relatively lower. The availability of derivative product of the better governed firm 
will induce investors with firm-specific information to trade in the derivative market 
because derivative offers them a low cost alternative to profit from their information 
set. Following this, another group of investors who prefer to maintain their position 
in the spot market are able to gather value-added signals from derivative trading 
activities and update their information set accordingly. The more frequent flow of 
information between derivative and spot market should improve spot price efficiency. 
Efficient stock price assists managers in their resource allocation decisions and 
eventually enhances firm performance. Taken together, it is reasonable to expect that 
the existence of institutional ownership should be able to influence the extent of 
derivative in firm performance generation.  
 
Studies also indicate that not all institutional investors are identical. Relative 
to domestic institutional investors, the foreign institutional owners are claimed to be 
more independent from the firm management and hence are more capable to take an 
active stance against the entrenched corporate insiders ( Ferreira & Matos, 2008; 
Garner & Kim, 2013; Chen, El Ghoul, Guedhami, & Wang, 2014) . In addition, they 
are also likely to import good governance practices from their home countries into 
their investee firms which located in poor governance countries ( Aggarwal, Ferreira 
& Matos, 2011) . This move is expected to shape the corporate culture of the host 
country investee firms and then lead to better firm governance and performance.  
However, some studies point out that foreign institutional investors may not be an 
